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Divorced but still co-habiting? Britain’s Prevent/Community 
Cohesion policy tension  




The relationship between Britain’s Prevent programme and wider 
multiculturalist policies of community cohesion has provoked much discussion 
but there has been less focus on how this relationship has been experienced at 
the local operational level. This article utilises available empirical data to 
analyse the nature of this policy relationship, arguing that Prevent has 
progressively side-lined and ‘crowded out’ cohesion practice at both the local 
and national level to the detriment of both counter-terrorism and community 
relations. Although questioning of the need for Prevent, local authorities 
reluctantly operationalised it through a ‘marriage’ with an initially equally-
resourced cohesion programme but the conceptual flaws and political weight 
of Prevent generated a perception and reality of enhanced securitisation and 
the side-lining of cohesion. The political solution of the 2011 Prevent Review 
was an organisational ‘divorce’ between the two policies and the government 
departments responsible for them. The article argues, however, that such 
separation was never possible at the local level and that they continue to co-
habit in an unequal and loveless relationship. Despite some positive aspects, 
the 2011Review has led to an increasingly securitised and still flawed Prevent, 
whilst community cohesion has officially been disowned by the Coalition 
government. 
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Introduction 
The shocking 2013 murder in Woolwich, south London of soldier Lee Rigby by 
two Islamist extremists highlighted the continuing reality of a domestic terror 
threat for Britain. This was amplified by the concurrent trial of six young 
Muslims from Birmingham who had planned violent attacks on an English 
Defence League rally held in Dewsbury West Yorkshire in 2012 (BBC News, 
2013). It also renewed political and media focus on ‘Prevent’, Britain’s 
terrorism prevention policy within the wider CONTEST counter-terrorism 
strategy (Home Office, 2003a). Hastily initiated in 2007 by the then-Labour 
government in response to the 7/7 London bombings of July 2005, Prevent 
(DCLG, 2007 a and b; Husband and Alam, 2011) proved increasingly 
controversial as it was implemented. Controversy particularly focussed on the 
problematic and blurred relationship between Prevent and the wider 
multiculturalist policy agenda of community cohesion, leading to the allegation 
that Prevent had ‘securitised multiculturalism’ (Ragazzi, 2012).In response, the 
new Coalition government’s June 2011 Prevent Review made significant 
changes to the organisation and scale of Prevent. Those organisational changes 
were widely interpreted as having positively addressed Prevent’s problematic 
relationship with cohesion. They involved removing the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) from any involvement in Prevent, 
so ending its programme of Prevent funding to local authorities for 
community-based work, and instructing DCLG to focus solely on cohesion, 
whilst the Home Office and its Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism 
(OSCT) led on Prevent. This certainly succeeded in taking Prevent out of the 
public and media eye until the Woolwich murder. For instance, the University 
of Bristol’s ‘Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Project’ final 
report describes a key Muslim advisor to national government as saying, prior 
to Woolwich, that ‘the more limited and lower profile Prevent strategy pursued 
under the Coalition government has been a positive development’ (O’Toole et 
al, 2013a:63). 
This article draws on existing empirical data to focus on the relationship at the 
local, operational level between Prevent and the pre-existing policy agenda of 
community cohesion. It examines how this relationship, or policy ‘marriage’, 
has been experienced within local implementation and what this suggests 
about the impact and effectiveness of the Prevent programme. It particularly 
addresses the formal separation, indeed ‘divorce’, of the two policies heralded 
in the 2011 Prevent Review, examining the motivations for this and analysing 
the reality of this divorce at ground-level. The article argues that such a divorce 
within local policy implementation was never feasible and that the two policies 
continue to co-habit within an unequal, problematic and arguably loveless 
relationship. Here, the claimed divorce and the associated downsizing of 
Prevent initiated by the 2011 Review have merely obscured, rather than 
solved, continuing conceptual problems of Prevent whilst seeing a further 
withering of the community cohesion agenda. 
To do this, the article draws on and analyses the available empirical evidence 
around Prevent’s local implementation and its relationship with community 
cohesion, discussing how this policy relationship – through marriage, divorce 
and unhealthy continued co-habitation - has been understood, experienced 
and mediated (for example, Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Lewis and Craig, 2014; 
O’Toole et al, 2013a; Vermeulen and Bovenkerk, 2012; Thomas, 2012; Husband 
and Alam, 2011; Lowndes and Thorp, 2010; Iacopini et al, 2011). This focus on 
local policy  mediation and enactment is particularly important because British 
multiculturalism has historically been significantly developed from below 
through local campaigning, local authority policy development and 
professional practice, as much as through national-level legislation and policy-
making (Solomos, 2003).Both community cohesion and Prevent  should be 
seen within this field of multiculturalist policymaking, for good or ill, because 
of the way they have characterised and sought to engage with  essentialised 
minority ethnic communities, especially Muslims (Thomas, 2012). Similarly, 
national level multiculturalist policy initiatives have often been significantly 
mediated and positively adapted at the local level (something even true for the 
early phase of Prevent: see Husband and Alam, 2011).This highlights the 
importance of examining situated ‘policy enactment’ (Braun et al, 2010).It also 
suggests that, whilst Prevent has undoubtedly represented an attempt by 
national government to securitise its relationship with British Muslims, the 
‘state’ itself has been divided and conflicted over its implementation, primarily 
on  national/local basis, but also between different departments of national 
government. 
It is the contention of this article that Prevent has always contained significant 
conceptual flaws that cannot be ‘solved’ by organisational changes alone. 
Addressing these conceptual problems would involve questioning whether 
Prevent, as it has been developed and operationalized to date, has any useful 
function as a terrorism prevention policy or is instead both ineffective and 
counter-productive on its own terms. Here, the developing community 
cohesion practice offered the possibility of a non-stigmatising and significantly 
less securitised approach to addressing extremist ideologies and attractions at 
the community level. However, firstly the ‘forced marriage’ with a Prevent 
programme holding a flatly contradictory approach to identity and citizenship 
(Cantle, 2001; Home Office, 2003b;Thomas, 2011),  , followed by the side-lining 
of cohesion in the face of the politically-favoured and resourced Prevent, has 
fatally undermined cohesion practice  (Monro et al, 2010;Husband and Alam, 
2011;Lewis and Craig, 2014). The formal divorce of the Prevent Review was 
largely superficial, leaving a continuing reality of an unequal policy relationship 
that contributes little to preventing extremism (O’Toole et al, 2013a and b; 
Browne, 2013). 
 In developing this argument, the article will first briefly analyse the post- 2001 
policy context of community cohesion and its operational reality at ground 
level before discussing what the article characterises as Prevent’s inherent 
conceptual flaws. It will then analyse Prevent’s operational relationship with 
cohesion (or ‘Integration’ as the post-2010 Coalition government has preferred 
to name it; DCLG, 2012).This will be done in two parts. First the article will 
discuss what it characterises as the marital tensions with cohesion in policy 
operation within the initial 2007-2010 Labour iteration of ‘Prevent 1’; it will 
then analyse the extent to which these flaws and tensions have continued 
under ‘Prevent 2’ , despite the divorce initiated by the Coalition’s 2011 Review 
and suggest that unequal policy  co-habitation has continued.  
Community Cohesion – a new direction for multiculturalism? 
The impact of Prevent cannot be analysed without consideration of the wider 
British policy context of multiculturalism, and its post-2001 move towards 
‘community cohesion’. Prompted by the 2001 riots in Oldham, Burnley and 
Bradford in the north of England but representing a policy direction that the 
then-Labour Government wanted to travel in anyway (Thomas, 2011), the 
adoption of community cohesion as a policy priority was highly controversial, 
with allegations of  a shift back to assimilationism (Cantle, 2001; Kundnani, 
2002; Alexander, 2004; Thomas, 2011). Here, the discursive shift from 
multiculturalism to community cohesion was understood by some as a 
rejection, even the ‘death’, of multiculturalism itself. It is certainly true that the 
post-riot Cantle Report urged an emphasis on commonality and shared values 
and experiences, rather than on continued reification of distinct ethnic and 
faith identities. Cantle’s concern with ‘parallel lives’ was less about physical 
segregation and more about how separate identities, potentially antagonistic 
to ‘others’, could harden in such monocultural situations. Here, there was a 
focus on agency, both as a partial cause of ‘parallel lives’ and as integral to the 
solution to it, that was consistent with the wider ‘third way’ social policy 
approach of the Labour government (Levitas, 2005). 
There was also an explicit critique of the previous policy phase of ‘political 
multiculturalism’ (Solomos, 2003). That approach, initiated in the wake of an 
earlier phase of inner-city rioting in the early 1980s, had sought to address 
Britain’s gross ethnic inequalities and blatant racism of the time through active 
policies deploying ‘strategic essentialism’ (Law, 1996) to improve the situation 
of, and facilities for, specific minority ethnic groups. Whilst contributing to 
substantial economic and social improvements for many minority ethnic 
citizens, this policy approach did have clear downsides, particularly in 
hardening and foregrounding distinct and separate ethnic identities (Malik, 
2009). This and the associated provision of ethnic-specific community facilities, 
arguably undermined commonality and limited opportunities for cross-
community social interaction. Racialised resentment and false claims about 
ethnic favouritism in public funding by sections of white communities were a 
significant contributory factor to the 2001 riots in the north of England, whilst 
enthically-essentialised policy approaches to tackling inequality increasingly 
failed to acknowledge the varied economic experiences between and even 
within specific minority ethnic communities (Modood et al, 1997). 
Such a focus on commonality, rather than difference, and unhelpful concurrent 
political attacks on ‘multiculturalism’ itself (Phillips, 2005; Cameron, 2011) and 
on Muslim communities specifically (Travis, 2001), fed perceptions of 
community cohesion as assimilationism. However, it was suggested earlier that 
that the meaning of multiculturalist measures such as the community cohesion 
policy agenda can only be understood by considering how they have actually 
been understood and practised. Evidence from how youth work agencies in 
Oldham, Great Manchester had operationalized cohesion (Thomas, 2007;2011) 
showed that, rather than denying ethnic differences, cohesion practice at 
ground level was acknowledging and even celebrating specific ethnic and faith 
youth identifications but was also prioritising commonality. They did this 
through programmes that brought young people of different ethnic and social 
backgrounds together in processes employing ‘contact theory’ (Hewstone et al, 
2007), a social psychology approach to long-term prejudice reduction . Here, 
cohesion was not seeking to replace distinct identifications but augment them 
with stronger forms of commonality through two-stage processes, so helping 
to de-racialise perceptions of structural economic experiences. This situated, 
cross-community ‘contact’ work with young people in Oldham mirrored the 
community cohesion efforts to promote contact and cross-community 
partnerships by local authorities elsewhere. Early central government-funded 
cohesion work did not just focus on such work between different ethnic 
communities but also supported inter-generational contact and projects 
bringing settled and travelling communities together (Home Office, 2003b). 
This was consistent with the more intersectional and ‘cooler’ conceptions of 
identity and experience that were implicit within Labour government policy 
approaches (McGhee, 2006). 
 Wider evidence indicates that this approach of rebalancing, rather than 
rejecting, multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2009) was enthusiastically 
received by local policymakers and practitioners nationally (Monro et al, 2010; 
Lewis and Craig, 2014), with community cohesion clearly embedded within a 
wider race equality government strategy (Home Office, 2005). The later, 
blanket call for ending all ‘single group’ funding (COIC, 2007) was seen by such 
local practitioners as unhelpful to the ‘two-stage’ cohesion process but this 
empirical evidence did highlight support for local funding and programmes that 
focussed on commonalities and contact rather than ethnic-specific needs. 
Prevent 1: Forced Marriage? 
It was within this context that Prevent was launched in 2007 (DCLG, 2007a and 
b).Originally identified in the Home Office (2003a) CONTEST strategy, Prevent 
was entirely undeveloped until the visceral shock of the 7/7 London bombings, 
as British security services had not expected domestic terrorism from Islamist 
extremists and were largely unprepared (Hewitt, 2008). The result was that 
Prevent was conceived and operationalized rapidly, arguably a problem that 
has dogged it ever since. 
The refreshed CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2009) outlined the shape of the 
resulting Prevent 1 agenda that involved a Department of Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) element working with local authorities, a Police 
Prevent strategy involving over 300 dedicated posts and newly-established 
Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs), and the ‘Channel’ Project focussed on work 
with individuals viewed as vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’ (itself a highly-
contested concept; Kundnani, 2012). The initial ‘Pathfinder’ year of work by 
local authorities commenced in April 2007, with the DCLG saying: 
 ‘security measures can protect us from the most immediate threats. But our 
long-term safety surely lies in winning hearts and minds’ (2007a:1). 
Funding went to 70 local authorities through the rather crude measure of them 
having 5% or more of their population being ‘Muslim’ (using old data around 
religious identification and ethnic origin from the 2001 Census), with this being 
extended to all areas with 2% or more in the subsequent 2008-11 expansion. 
This local authority Prevent work was to run parallel to similarly nationally-
funded community cohesion work in a supposedly complementary marriage. 
Alongside that local authority Prevent activity, mainly involving direct work 
with Muslim youth and community organisations by the local authorities 
themselves, or by Muslim community organisations that they passed funding 
on to, came the development of Prevent work with young offenders and in 
adult prisons. In contrast to such direct, education-based work, Prevent activity 
with Universities and Further Education Colleges (DIUS, 2008; HMG, 2011) did 
not largely involve direct work with students, but rather enhanced liaison 
between the educational institutions and CTUs to ensure greater scrutiny of 
Muslim student group activity on and around campuses. 
The Conceptual problems of Prevent 
Two inter-related conceptual problems within Prevent were rapidly identified, 
both by academic critics and by the local policy-makers and practitioners 
charged with implementing it. The first was a monocultural focus on Muslims 
only, so ignoring others types of extremism and re-enforcing, rather than 
questioning, the belief that Islamist extremism was a problem within 
essentialised ‘Muslim’ community life and religious belief. Whilst community 
cohesion questioned simplistic and essentialised understandings of 
identification and experience and sought to engage with communities on a 
different, broader basis, Prevent identified and worked with simplistic, reified 
notions of essentialised Muslim identity and ‘communities’. It did this on a 
large-scale, with the government boasting of having worked with almost 
50,000 young Muslims in the initial ‘Pathfinder’ (or PVE) year (DCLG, 2008), 
often through very mundane but Muslim-only youth activities. Very 
considerable funding went to national Muslim bodies and to local Muslim 
groups via local authorities for civil society capacity building, again money for 
Muslims only and from an explicitly anti-terrorism fund. At the national level 
there were explicit attempts by government by promote different and 
‘moderate’ forms of Islamic theological interpretation (Thomas, 2012). Here, a 
‘conveyer belt’ model of radicalisation (Kundnani, 2012) seemed to be 
employed that portrayed terrorism as a virus (Gupta, 2008) that young 
Muslims could catch from anyone with particular theological or political 
perspectives. However, the Prevent response was to create even more 
‘Muslim-only’ spaces and places, rather than to challenge barriers preventing 
young Muslims from participating in wider British society. This very 
considerable state funding for British Muslims inevitably re-ignited ‘virulent 
envy’ (Birt, 2009) from non-Muslim communities whilst deepening the sense of 
persecution amongst Muslims. 
Alongside this large-scale, monocultural state focus on Muslims as a response 
to terrorist acts by a small number of individuals came an explicit securitisation 
(Noxolo and Huysmans, 2009) of the state’s relationship with British Muslims 
through both the scale and nature of Prevent. Here, the increasing Police/CTU 
prominence in directing Prevent locally and even getting involved in direct 
engagement with Muslim youth and their communities (Knight, 2010)  quickly 
fuelled fears about Prevent being cover for spying and large-scale surveillance 
of British Muslims (Kundnani, 2009). Such questioning of Prevent’s real 
motives was also driven by Prevent’s  blatant attempts to engineer different 
and arguably more polyphonic forms of representation of Muslims at a 
national level through the development of ‘Advisory Groups’ for Muslim youth 
and women, as well as promotion of ‘moderate’ forms of religious 
interpretation (Birt, 2009).  
The Prevent 1/Community Cohesion relationship in practice 
This clear and unequivocal, large-scale monocultural focus on Muslims was 
immediately seen as highly problematic by local authorities (Husband and 
Alam, 2011). This was not only because it was blatantly contradictory to the 
community cohesion policy agenda of more intersectional understandings of 
identity (McGhee, 2006) and greater commonality they were being asked to 
implement by the same government department, but also because they very 
much supported the underlying analysis of that cohesion agenda – the tensions 
they identified were conceptual, not just organisational. Here, local 
policymakers and practitioners had accepted that the strategic essentialism 
(Law, 1996) of the previous ‘political multiculturalism’ policy phase was both 
increasingly problematic in terms of the reaction from some white majority 
communities (mirrored in other European states, such as The Netherlands: 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2009) and increasingly crude in relation to the 
complex inequalities and experiences within minority communities. The five 
local authorities in West Yorkshire – home of the 7/7 bombers and site of the 
2001 Bradford riot - made it clear that they appreciated the terror threat but 
did not see a new and separate ’counter-terrorism’ engagement programme as 
helpful. Husband and Alam’s study of policy implementation in the five West 
Yorkshire local authorities identifies: 
 ‘the significant hostility that was generated by the introduction of Prevent and 
the extent to which implementing it at local state level constituted a personal 
and organisational challenge’ (2011:130). 
These West Yorkshire local policy-makers and their practitioners saw the 
community cohesion programmes they were already enthusiastically 
developing as the best and most effective response to the threat of extremism 
within and between communities. The report of a ‘good practice’ event 
organised by their West Yorkshire Community Cohesion Project Board during 
the initial Prevent ‘Pathfinder’ year of 2007/8 highlighted that: 
 ‘participants felt that a number of aspects of the Government’s approach to 
the PVE agenda have made it difficult for local government and other partners 
to engage with local communities’ (AWYA, 2008a:2).  
This unease was not just about Prevent’s lurch back to single ethnic community 
funding programmes but the counter-productive, stigmatising effects of 
approaching entire Muslim communities through an explicitly anti-terrorism 
programme – this was simply not a helpful basis for encouraging communities 
to honestly identify internal problems and to co-operate with others in 
challenging them. This was highlighted by the refusal of Bradford Council (then 
Conservative-led) to take Prevent funding on the basis offered because of its 
likely negative impact on community cohesion (O’Toole et al, 2013:58). 
Rochdale was another northern authority that initially refused participation 
until the compromise of positive research and development activity with 
young people of all ethnic backgrounds was reached (Thomas and Sanderson, 
2011), whilst other local authorities simply passed all Prevent funding on to 
Muslim community organisations to avoid perceptions of ‘picking favourites’ 
(Kundnani, 2009). 
The umbrella Association of West Yorkshire Authorities developed a ‘Response 
to the PVE agenda’ annex as part of their wider ‘Cohesion in West Yorkshire’ 
statement, identifying that violent extremism undermines cohesion, so: 
 ‘our main response to the threat of violent extremism, therefore must be to 
pursue the integrated and cohesive community described in the main part of 
this statement’ (AWYA, 2008b:5).   
Such feelings were shared by local authorities nationally, as identified by a 
2009 report by think-tank the New Local Government Network, which helped 
prompt the CLG Select Committee Inquiry:  
‘The Prevent agenda and community cohesion should support and foster one 
another. Many in local government feel that this is currently not the case.’ 
(Turley, 2009:11) 
However, that report also acknowledged that the Labour government had, as 
part of their response to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007c), 
allocated a further £50 million funding in support of local authority community 
cohesion work, so making the spend on cohesion comparable to the £51 
million for local authority Prevent work between 2007 and 2011. This was 
arguably a genuine twin-track policy approach, representing an equal 
marriage. Indeed, this strategy of asking local authorities to operationalize 
Prevent alongside the continuation of their developing community cohesion 
work was a deliberate national policy approach. Here, a programme 
channelling money towards work with Muslim communities through the DCLG, 
the department also concerned with local authorities, equality and community 
cohesion, could be seen as a progressive, partnership-based approach to 
working with Muslim communities rather than carrying out surveillance upon 
them (McGhee, 2010). That was certainly the view of Sir David Omand, the 
author of Prevent and the overall CONTEST strategy, who saw the split of 
Prevent work between the security-focused Home Office and the DCLG, as 
vital: 
 ‘There was a deliberate attempt to get the Local Government Department to 
lead this, and to try and do it in a way that is based on the locality and not the 
ethnicity’ (APPGHS, 2011:106).  
However, the Muslim-only focus of Prevent and the increasing Police/CTU 
control of the programme at local and national level (Lamb, 2012), as discussed 
below, meant that this was a rose-tinted view, at best, and a deliberate 
obscuration of a securitised agenda at worst. 
Initially, though, the DCLG funding for local authority Prevent work did allow 
significant latitude for local decision-making. Many re-named the programme, 
using opaque titles like ‘Pathfinder’ during the pilot year (Thomas, 2008) or less 
provocative labels, such as Leicester’s ‘Mainstreaming Moderation’ (House of 
Commons, 2010) as the programme developed. They also used it to pursue 
broader and pre-existing community development goals (Lowndes and Thorp, 
2010) around strengthening civic society organisations and the local state’s 
relationship with them (Lewis and Craig, 2014). The London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets is one example where the initial iteration of Prevent enabled a greater 
local engagement with newer ethnic communities and with the Muslim faith 
sector generally: 
‘Prevent has given access to projects, people and organisations that would 
have not normally accessed this funding. This includes less-established 
community organisations and/or those that work with different target groups 
(in particular the Somali community)’ (Iacopini et al, 2011:6). 
Here, Prevent arguably provided a timely and opportunistic vehicle to create 
more polyphonic engagement with Muslim faith groups, part of Labour’s third 
way approach of acknowledging faith identity at the same time as also 
developing community cohesion strategies implicitly built around promotion of 
greater commonality and ‘cooler’, more intersectional forms of specific 
identification within a framework of individual ‘human rights’ (McGhee, 2006). 
However, the contradiction between this monoculturally-focussed Prevent and 
community cohesion remained stark for local authorities charged with 
enacting both policies. A case study of multiculturalist policy enactment in 
Sheffield, South Yorkshire during this period suggested that: 
‘The result for local actors is a dual, conflicting process: community cohesion 
de-emphasises ‘race’, while ethnic and religious differences are accentuated in 
security and immigration discourses’ (Lewis and Craig, 2014:22). 
Whilst local authorities were initially able to exploit policy space to avoid the 
language and exclusionary focus of Prevent and still taking funding, they 
quickly came under pressure via the Prevent ‘NI (National Indicator) 35’ local 
government monitoring and reporting mechanism, as an extract from the 2008 
Local Government Association (LGA) briefing document Strategic Issues: 
Preventing Violent Extremism shows: 
The Home Office (HO) believe that local authorities that do not select NI: 35 are 
not prioritising Prevent and concluding that little or no Prevent work is being 
undertaken. To persuade local authorities to select NI: 35, the HO is applying 
pressure via the Police, and senior officials during Local Area Agreement 
negotiations which has had only limited success. (LGA, 2008) 
Alongside this increasing pressure to operationalize Prevent programmes that 
were clearly contradictory to community cohesion in terms of their conceptual 
focus and philosophy came an associated pressure on local authorities to 
establish and run the local Prevent multi-agency co-ordination groups known 
as ‘Gold’, ‘Silver’ and ‘Bronze’. These two demands from national government 
fell on the same local policy officers and practitioners charged with devising 
and implementing community cohesion programmes, and the evidence from a 
case study of how the two policy agendas were developed in two key West 
Yorkshire local authorities was that  emerging community cohesion structures 
and practice was inevitably marginalised and side-lined by the national 
prioritisation of Prevent (Monro et al, 2010;Thomas, 2012).This is endorsed by 
a thoughtful further study of how the two policy agendas had played out 
across the five West Yorkshire authorities: 
 ‘the data provides substantive support for the concerns that have been 
expressed elsewhere regarding the damaging impact of Prevent on community 
cohesion initiatives’ (Husband and Alam, 2011:189). 
This local experience was mirrored at the national government level, where 
Prevent squeezed DCLG-led community cohesion to the policy margins through 
its Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)- led money and power, as 
admitted by a senior civil servant: ‘so what happened was Prevent took over 
cohesion’ (O’Toole et al, 2013: 57). Within Prevent itself, a similar ‘crowding 
out’ process took place, as the Police and Security Services quickly became the 
dominant partners. Here, local authorities at ground level were ill-equipped in 
terms of both resources and experience to lead Prevent, given its conceptual, 
securitised focus on ‘threats’, ‘heat maps’ and intelligence about them, leaving 
the door open for Police/CTU to dominate programmes supposedly 
encompassing education and community engagement. This is highlighted in an 
empirical study of the role played by West Midlands CTU and its officers in 
Prevent: 
The Police seem to have been given the responsibility of delivering Prevent 
because other local bodies did not possess the organisational capability to 
successfully implement, manage and adapt a programme… despite Prevent 
being proposed as a multi-organisational programme, the Police in the West 
Midlands  are the central organisation and undertake the majority of the work 
relating to Prevent  (Lamb, 2012:91).    
Some of this was deliberate and structural, as shown by the fact that the DCLG 
had no permanent seat on the cross-departmental Joint Intelligence 
Committee that directed OSCT and counter-terrorism, despite the emollient 
language of Sir David Omand about the vital role of DCLG and its experience of 
community engagement (Turley, 2009). Alongside this was the conceptual 
problem of Prevent – Omand and the OSCT talked warmly of the need to 
involve DCLG and local authorities in community engagement-based Prevent 
work but, as highlighted above, local authorities simply didn’t understand how 
such an  overtly securitised counter-terrorism programme, separate and 
distinct from community cohesion , was actually meant to work in community 
settings. This confusion was shared by civil servants nationally at the DCLG, as 
incoming DCLG Minister John Denham identified: 
I found in the CLG, after some very rigorous examinations with officials that 
there was no understood model of how Prevent was meant to work (O’Toole et 
al, 2013a:57). 
This helps explain the characterisation of Prevent as a ‘crime prevention’ 
programme that Denham (DCLG, 2009) then put forward, an assertion that 
didn’t stand up when the then scale and approach of Prevent was considered, 
and his attempt to focus on white extremism through the ‘Connecting 
Communities’ programme. Both initiatives can be understood as attempts to 
answer the growing criticisms of Prevent by a Minster and a department 
clearly unconvinced themselves by the Home Office-driven policy agenda. 
Those criticisms and their implications are discussed in the next section. 
A marriage on the rocks? 
The inherent, conceptual problems of Prevent and the ‘marital tensions’ with 
cohesion outlined above quickly led Prevent to a crisis point in 2009. Here 
political, operational and academic critiques all contributed to a very public 
assault on the assumptions and impacts of Prevent and to specific 
recommendations for a radical policy overhaul. 
Central here was the ‘Spooked’ report (Kundnani, 2009) that crystallised and 
developed the widely-held concern that Prevent was a large-scale surveillance 
project directed at British Muslim communities. Drawing on a solid evidential 
basis, ‘Spooked’ developed a detailed case around the increasing dominance of 
Police/CTU personnel at all levels of Prevent operation and the apparent 
blurring of appropriate roles and responsibilities resulting from this 
dominance. This evidence included the ‘embedding’ of CTU officers within local 
authority processes of grant assessment and decision-making regarding local 
youth projects and Muslim community organisations, with such decision-
making processes rather opaque despite the significant budgets involved and 
apparently arbitrary judgments made by such CTU personnel regarding the 
suitability of Muslim groups and individuals. A Financial Times investigation in 
to Prevent (Knight, 2010) observed CTU staff directly delivering internet 
awareness sessions to Muslim parents, something that community workers 
would normally do, whilst Husband and Alam (2011) identified the ‘chilling 
effect’ on local Muslim professionals as they were both expected to provide 
access to ‘their’ Muslim communities but were also scrutinised around their 
trustworthiness as Muslims. 
To a certain extent, government was up front about this securitised scrutiny on 
Muslim communities within Prevent. Sir David Omand commented to the All-
Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security in 2010 that: 
 ’you can’t divide government in two, into those people that go around spying 
on the population, and there are another lot of people going round to the 
population and they just don’t talk to each other. It just simply doesn’t work 
like that’ (APPGHS, 2011:107). 
Omand was even blunter in an interview given to the Financial Times weeks 
before that (Knight, 2010), when he suggested that it would be naïve of the 
state to not use any intelligence from community-based Prevent activities, in 
the face of a very serious terrorist threat. Such a relaxed interpretation of a 
policy agenda supposedly about community-based engagement and education 
was not shared by sections of the media (Dodd, 2009) or the CLG Select 
Committee, who were gravely worried about the Prevent role that the DCLG 
was being required to enact (House of Commons, 2010). This was also fuelled 
by a growing academic critique of Prevent’s conceptual problems (Thomas, 
2009; Birt, 2009) and a carefully-argued report from the New Local 
Government Network think-tank, which questioned the need for a continuing 
and separate Prevent programme: 
 ‘it is time to review whether the separation of the PVE approach from wider 
community cohesion is still relevant’ (Turley, 2009:13). 
Such critiques were aired at length during the Select Committee’s oral 
evidence sessions. The varied evidence put forward suggested that Prevent 
was indeed ‘between two stools’ (Thomas, 2008) and ‘failed and friendless’ 
(Thomas, 2010) in that no one was satisfied with Prevent’s reality. Amplifying 
the critiques outlined above, Leicester City Council highlighted how Prevent 
had undermined their nationally-renowned cohesion work (House of 
Commons, 2010:58), whilst Peacemaker, a charity doing real cohesion work 
with young people long before 2001, alleged that Prevent's focus had 
undermined both cohesion and race equality work through its monocultural 
focus and  in ironically giving funding to exactly the sort of older, conservative 
‘community leaders’ seen as a block to those agendas. Evidence from local 
authorities and their umbrella bodies clearly identified tensions between, and 
inconsistent advice from, the two national government departments directing 
Prevent, with the LGA saying that: 
‘Tensions between OSCT and CLG on the nature of the focus of Prevent and the 
activity which should flow from that can be a problem at times. We in local 
government support John Denham MP’s view of Prevent as distinct but 
necessarily situated within the broader context of community cohesion and 
equalities’ (House of Commons, 2010:57. 
The other side of this coin was shown in the evidence presented by the 
Association of Police Authorities, which complained that much Prevent funding 
had been wasted by local authorities through diversion to ‘softer’ community 
cohesion work:   
‘Much of the PVE funded project work in local areas does not have a specific 
enough focus upon preventing violent extremism, and many police authorities 
question whether, in practice, there is any real difference between Prevent and 
community cohesion’ (House of Commons, 2010: Ev.144). 
Here, of course, APA was misunderstanding ‘community cohesion’. The 
Prevent work going on through local authorities was with Muslims only, so 
being main-stream community development work, but certainly not the cross-
community cohesion work that local authorities wanted to operationalize as 
the best defence against extremism. 
The Select Committee reached clear conclusions about both the Prevent/ 
cohesion relationship and DCLG’s place within it. They concluded that: ‘CLG 
should have less of a role in the counter-terrorism agenda and more in the 
positive work it undertakes in building strong and cohesive communities’ 
(House of Commons, 2010: Para 171, p.67), and that ‘we recommend that all 
interventions, including Channel, which are clearly targeted at crime prevention 
be brought under the remit of the Home Office‘(Para 173, p.68). This could be 
seen, and was subsequently understood as such by many, as agreeing that the 
cohesion/Prevent problem was organisational and would be solved by a clear 
departmental split. However, the conceptual critique of Prevent by the 
Committee could also be seen: 
‘The government needs to acknowledge community cohesion work-particularly 
that focussed on tackling exclusion- as a much sharper tool in the long-term 
fight against violent extremism’ (Para. 165, p.66) and that ‘Funding for 
cohesion work in all communities should be increased. That work should be 
done on a thematic basis and not on a monocultural or individual community 
basis… Without adequate funding for community cohesion and tackling 
exclusion, breeding grounds for extremism become stronger’ (Para.170, p.67). 
These recommendations and the actions of Minister John Denham above can 
be seen as going as far as politically possible towards the questioning of the 
need for a distinct Prevent policy. This conceptual, rather than just 
organisational, critique of Prevent was apparently accepted by the two main 
opposition parties, soon to become the Coalition government after the May 
2010 election. During the Inquiry process, Conservative shadow minister Dame 
Pauline Neville-Jones (2009) said that ‘Labour continues to treat people 
according to ethnicity and creed. They see Muslims as people who need special 
attention and special funds…Prevent should be aimed at bringing citizens and 
communities together’. For the Liberal Democrats, Chris Huhne commented 
that ‘The Prevent programme alienates and marginalises Muslim communities, 
and exacerbates racist bias and ignorant views’ (Dodd, 2010). Such a clear 
conceptual critique of the Prevent/community cohesion relationship was, 
however, not to be employed when in government. 
Prevent 2: Conceptual problems remain? 
Immediately suspending local authority Prevent work when elected in May 
2010, the Coalition government’s subsequent Prevent Review of June 2011 
(HMG, 2011) seemingly accepted some of the Select Committee’s key 
recommendations in that it removed DCLG from involvement in Prevent and 
transferred sole control for Prevent to the Home Office’s Office for Security 
and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT): 
 ‘The Prevent programme we inherited from the last government was flawed. It 
confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with 
Government policy to prevent terrorism’ (HMG, 2011:1). 
Here, in a policy ‘divorce’, DCLG were now to concentrate exclusively on 
cohesion, as discussed below. This, and the associated downsizing in the scale 
and breadth of the new Prevent to just 28 local authority areas, identified and 
funded on an intelligence basis, did succeed in winning broad support. This was 
arguably because no one was actually satisfied with Prevent 1, albeit for 
significantly different reasons (Thomas, 2009; 2010). 
Immediate political and media responses to the revised strategy were mixed 
(Cavanagh, 2011) but even critics suggested that: 
Yesterday's sensible decision to separate out community cohesion programmes 
– whose inclusion in earlier Prevent packages had led to accusations of spy 
networks – is welcome (The Guardian, 8
th
 June, 2011). 
However, in a number of ways Prevent 2 continued, or even deepened, the 
conceptual problems of Prevent. Firstly, Prevent funding for local authorities 
was greatly reduced but the list of funded areas still resembled the areas with 
the biggest Muslim populations (O’Toole et al, 2012).  A Freedom of 
Information request (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2012) revealed that these areas 
have together received £3 million per annum since 2011 to carry out Prevent 
activity. Such funding is not guaranteed and to carry out educational work in 
communities local authorities must bid directly to the security-focussed OSCT 
against set criteria, so severely curtailing local autonomy. However, ‘Despite 
the tightening up and closer regulation of Prevent that was ushered in by the 
2011 strategy, that picture of local variation has continued’ (O’Toole et al, 
2013b). An example of this is Leicester, which after the 2011 Review again 
refused to implement Prevent as national government demanded, or accept a 
Home Office-funded Prevent officer in the Council. Instead, Prevent, as it is in 
Leicester, is delivered via an inter-faith centre which also runs the DCLG’s Near 
Neighbours programme (O’Toole et al, 2013b). 
Even if not Prevent-funded, local authorities are required to maintain Prevent 
programmes alongside multi-agency co-ordination arrangements and tension-
monitoring processes, whilst some have also had to deal with the very 
significant costs and public order threats associated with rallies by far-right 
groups such as the English Defence League that can be understood as part of 
an on-going cycle of ‘cumulative extremism’ (Eatwell, 2006).  National 
government’s concern that this is not being done was highlighted in the report 
of the Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism (TREFOR) (HMG, 
2013), established following the Woolwich murder. The report threatened to 
make implementation of the Prevent strategy a legal requirement, asserting 
that they would: 
 ‘take steps to intervene where local authorities are not taking the problem 
seriously’, and that ‘it is not always the case’ that practitioners have the 
support of these employers (HMG, 2013:6). 
These somewhat astonishing national government assertions, coupled with the 
increased centralisation of the reduced Prevent programme and the Leicester 
tensions highlighted above, indicated that significant national/local tensions 
continue to exist within the revised Prevent strategy. 
Coming just a few weeks before far-right terrorist Anders Breivik carried out 
his massacre in Norway, the Review did  hold open the possibility of Prevent 
engaging with different types of extremism (HMG,2011:23) but suggested that 
far-right racist violence was much ‘ less widespread, systematic or organised’ 
(ibid:15 ) and re-iterated the overwhelming need to continuing focussing on 
Islamist violence. This possibility of a broader Prevent focus on all types of 
extremism was a key factor in positive political and media responses but there 
is little or no evidence available to date that such work is developing in a 
meaningful way. An exception here is Wales. Despite Prevent being a ‘reserved 
power’ and so controlled by the Westminster government, The Welsh 
Assembly Government (WAG) and its local authority and Police partners have 
identified far-right extremism as a significant threat within Prevent: 
‘the emerging threat appears to be from extreme right-wing groups...locally its 
identified as our emerging threat and our emerging issue... so naturally the 
focus is on that... this borne out by our number of referrals where probably the 
majority are extreme right-wing’ (South Wales Police Prevent Officer cited in 
Cantle and Thomas, 2014:15). 
This has enabled official support and encouragement for imaginative anti-far 
right extremism work (Cantle and Thomas, 2014) but the fact that Swansea is 
not a Prevent-funded area means that this work is funded by the Big Lottery 
Fund charity, not the OSCT. 
That OSCT, staffed by Counter-Terrorism Police and Security Service Officers, 
now scrutinises and approves all bids for local Prevent activity via local 
authorities. Whilst national Prevent funding to local authorities has been 
greatly reduced and strictly nationally controlled, Prevent funding for 
dedicated Police posts seems to be undiminished. Together, these 
developments suggest a further and significant securitisation within Prevent. 
The diminution of local authority Prevent funding and the loss of autonomy 
over it has significantly reduced (but not eliminated: O’Toole et al, 2013b) the 
ability to react to local circumstances and space for Muslim community 
organisations to demonstrate ‘responsibility’ (McGhee, 2010) and counter-
terrorism leadership. Similarly, there is now a clear reluctance to support 
empowerment work with Muslim women and young people under Prevent 2 
(Browne, 2013). Therefore, it was not surprising that, in the wake of the 
Woolwich murder, former Labour ministers closely connected to Prevent 1 
criticised this loss of local funding and direction under Prevent 2 (Boffey and 
Doward, 2013). 
That larger-scale Prevent 1 programme had been based on a pragmatic, 
‘means-based’ (Birt, 2009) approach of funding for and engagement with a 
variety of Muslim community organisations with influence over vulnerable 
young Muslims. However, the 2011 Review was significantly delayed by 
disputes within the Coalition (both between and within the two constituent 
parties; Thomas, 2012) over the extent to which the new iteration would take 
a ’values-based’ approach (Birt, 2009) reflecting Prime Minister Cameron’s 
(2011) ‘muscular liberalism’ speech to the Munich Security Conference. That 
speech explicitly criticised attitudes and dispositions within British Muslim 
communities on the very day that the Islamophobic English Defence League 
marched through London (Thomas, 2012).The speech claimed that 
‘multiculturalism’ had led to toleration of people who rejected ‘our values’ and 
that: 
‘Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but 
who accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real hostility 
towards western democracy and liberal values’ (Cameron, 2011). 
This led to withdrawal of Prevent funding from a number of Muslim 
organisations, viewed as antagonistic to ‘our values’, even before the 2011 
Review announced that: ‘preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist 
(and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology’ (HMG, 
2011:6). 
Divorced… but still co-habiting? 
The withdrawal of the DCLG from involvement in Prevent was portrayed as 
good for both community cohesion and Prevent by addressing their supposed 
overlap and confusion, so strengthening both: ‘Prevent depends on a successful 
integration strategy’ (HMG, 2011:23). 
However, this was hardly a case of all speed ahead for community cohesion. 
Prior to 2011, the national prioritisation and compulsory local enactment of 
Prevent had already side-lined development of community cohesion policy and 
practice (Munro et al, 2010; Thomas, 2012), whilst post-crash austerity 
increasingly squeezed budgets for cohesion work seen as less nationally vital 
then Prevent. Having criticised Prevent in opposition for approaching and 
funding entire Muslim communities only as Muslims, not as British citizens 
(Neville-Jones, 2009), the dominant Conservative element of the Coalition 
might have been expected to prioritise cohesion or ‘integration’, but instead 
they visibly washed their hands of any concern with it. Delayed even longer 
than the Prevent review, the eventual Coalition policy document on 
‘Integration’ (DCLG, 2012, deployed as part of a deliberate attempt to avoid 
Labour’s language of ‘community cohesion’) was a flimsy and woefully brief 
document. Rejecting any notion of national targets or monitoring, it portrayed 
Integration as entirely a local matter that national government would offer no 
comment on: 
‘We are committed to re-balancing activity from centrally-led to locally-led 
action and from the public to the voluntary and private sectors’ (DCLG, 2012:2). 
It confirmed the ending of all national policy direction (including the 
disappearance of the DCLG’s dedicated Race Equality team), and funding on 
cohesion/integration whilst failing to use the terms ‘racism’ or ‘equalities’ 
(Runneymede Trust, 2012) at all. This can be seen as a part of a wider 
disinterest in the Equalities agenda that has included scrapping Equality Impact 
Assessments and the regime of Comprehensive Area Assessments/ Local Area 
Agreements which drove progress on equalities, whilst even questioning the 
future of the National Census that provides the data essential to identifying 
structural ethnic inequalities (Ratcliffe, 2012). The claim that this dismantling 
of cohesion/integration work was simply driven by the wider, and very deep, 
cuts in overall public spending (which have fallen disproportionately on local 
authorities serving multicultural urban areas) was undermined by the fact that 
the only national funding identified for Integration work was modest support 
for the Church of England’s Near Neighbours programme and the Scout 
Association (DCLG, 2012), both largely white and ‘establishment’ organisations. 
The ideological direction this represents was consistent with the stress on 
‘values’ in the Prevent Review. 
Whilst community cohesion/Integration has been largely side-lined and 
undermined as a policy agenda (in England) and British local authorities have 
undergone very significant spending cuts as a whole, all those local authorities 
have been forced to continue focussing on Prevent-related activity, as 
discussed above. In almost all cases, these responses have to come from the 
same local authority officers and practitioners charged with continuing to work 
on cohesion and integration (O’Toole et al, 2012), so giving the lie to the 
supposed demarcation of the Prevent Review. Indeed, the ‘Muslim 
Participation in Contemporary Governance’ project identifies that: ‘our data 
suggests that actors charged with the delivery of Prevent are sceptical about 
this separation’ (O’Toole et al, 2013:61) and quotes one local Police Prevent 
co-ordinator as saying: 
‘It’s virtually the same individuals who are involved in the cohesion bit that are 
predominantly involved in the Prevent’ (O’Toole et al, 2013:61). 
Here, the Prevent activity that has continued in the 28 funded areas is 
organised through local authorities. Key local authority staff (national 
government funds a Prevent co-ordinator in the 28 funded  areas but they 
inevitably sit and operate within wider community safety and engagement 
departments and teams) have to develop proposals and bid for funding, whilst 
local authority practitioners lead and implement much of the funded 
programmes. In both cases, these are largely the same local authority staff 
responsible for continuing to develop cohesion and integration activity despite 
the absence of national government funding or interest. The national policy 
and departmental distinction between Prevent and cohesion/integration 
supposedly implemented by the Prevent Review simply doesn’t, and can’t, 
exist on the ground. The failure of elite political actors to recognise this 
continuing ground-level reality was highlighted by one of the conclusions 
within the Home Affairs Select Committee Inquiry Report into ‘The Roots of 
Violent Radicalisation’: 
‘Witnesses tended to broadly welcome the outcome of the Prevent Review, 
following the clearer split between counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation work, the separation out of activity between the Home Office, 
focussing on violent extremism and the DCLG focussing on non-violent 
extremism’ (House of Commons 2012:19). 
This claimed distinction was not and is not recognisable at the ground 
operational level, and again highlights the national/local state tensions and 
‘disconnect’ over Prevent. The Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) Prevent 
prioritisation of far-right extremist threats was discussed above. This Welsh 
model of Prevent has been developed within a close and arguably equal 
relationship with community cohesion. The Labour-controlled WAG not only 
still uses the term ‘community cohesion’ but also has an activist policy 
approach of funding local authority cohesion co-ordinators and genuinely 
educational preventative work (Cantle and Thomas, 2014). This indicates that 
state tensions over both the nature of Prevent and its relationship with 
community cohesion are within the increasingly-devolved national state, as 
well as on a local/national basis. It also suggests that the Labour Party 
continues to support the Prevent 1 model of distinct but equally –supported 
policy programmes. Contrastingly, the Coalition’s Prevent 2, in England at 
least, represents the triumph of Prevent over community cohesion and the 
dominance of the securitisation-focussed OSCT/Home Office over the DCLG. 
Conclusion 
The relationship between Britain’s Prevent programme and the parallel policy 
priority of community cohesion/Integration has been both problematic and 
controversial throughout Prevent’s life. The nature of this relationship has 
been central to the persistent allegation that Prevent is little more than a 
large-scale surveillance programme aimed at British Muslims en bloc 
(Kundnani, 2009). This article has suggested that the very need for a distinct 
Prevent programme was questioned by local authorities but that they then 
reluctantly operationalised it alongside the community cohesion programmes 
they had enthusiastically developed. The fundamental problem here was that 
Prevent, with its monocultural and large-scale focus on essentialised ‘Muslim’ 
communities and its highly-questionable model of ‘radicalisation’ (Kundnani, 
2012), was flatly contradictory to the policy approach of cohesion. Evidence of 
this policy relationship, or marriage, in operation during Prevent 1 shows that 
Prevent progressively side-lined and undermined local cohesion policy and 
practice, leading to an enhanced securitisation of community relations. These 
local policy tensions mirrored tensions within the national state itself. 
The analysis of the 2011 Prevent Review was that the relationship was 
organisationally flawed and that this could be solved through ‘divorce’, by 
removing the DCLG from Prevent. This would supposedly create a structural 
divide between Prevent and cohesion/Integration, Home Office and DCLG, 
which would be mutually beneficial to both policy agendas. This article has 
argued that this analysis is both superficial and inaccurate, because such a 
policy demarcation is simply not possible at the local, operational level. The 
justification for the clumsy policy ‘marriage’ between Prevent 1 and cohesion 
was that the two policy agendas were equally resourced and regarded by the 
national state. This claim was already questionable by 2009 and is now 
completely discredited under the Coalition. 
Therefore, the Prevent/community cohesion relationship being 
operationalised in England now arguably represents the worst scenario 
possible. Any national direction and support for cohesion/integration has 
disappeared whilst the same policy officers and practitioners charged with 
attempting to take cohesion forward locally are still facing Prevent demands 
from OSCT nationally. Since the Prevent Review, autonomy over the direction 
and content of Prevent activity has very significantly reduced, but local 
authorities are still expected to organise and deliver the work. The Prevent-
funded local authority areas now have to apply for funding to the OSCT at six-
monthly intervals against OSCT-determined criteria, with many applications 
going as far as Minsters themselves before being approved. Detailed scrutiny 
and approval is by the OSCT staff of Police and Security Service personnel. It 
can be seen here that the Prevent Review of 2011 represents a less wide but 
deeper securitisation of local Prevent activity and hence of the local state’s 
relationship with Muslim communities. This further securitised Prevent agenda 
is still delivered and co-ordinated local by local authorities and their staff, 
despite the removal of DCLG from the policy agenda. Meanwhile 
cohesion/integration policy work has progressively slipped off the national 
agenda. 
The ‘problem’ with Prevent has never been organisational  and cannot be 
solved by the policy ‘divorce’, as empirical evidence on local policy 
relationships demonstrate. Instead, the fundamental conceptual problems of 
Prevent 1 –the monocultural and securitised focus on Muslims and the 
questionable model of radicalisation based on the need for ‘moderate’ Muslim 
communities and theology – have continued in to Prevent 2. These problems 
are less visible and less widespread in their impact, but they have been 
deepened by the enhanced, securitised focus on ‘values’ (now apparently 
strengthened: HMG, 2013). We now have the worst of all worlds – a flawed, 
centralised and increasingly securitised Prevent programme and a side-lined 
cohesion/Integration agenda, with a loveless and profoundly unequal policy 
co-habitation continuing at the local level. The article has highlighted 
significant local/national and intra-national state tensions during this process, 
and the experiences of Leicester (O’Toole et al, 2013b) and Wales (Cantle and 
Thomas, 2014) show that different policy directions are possible. 
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